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Abstract 
This paper studies effects of unemployment and labour market programmes on real wages in the 
Czech and Slovak Republics using district panel data for the period 1992-1998. Clear evidence of 
a “wage curve” exists in both countries. The estimated unemployment elasticity of pay is, 
however, higher in the Slovak Republic, than in the Czech Republic. The wage subsidy and the 
public works programme exert upward pressure on real wages in Slovakia. When accounting for 
effects from adjacent districts, a positive significant effect of labour market programmes is also 
estimated for the Czech Republic. 
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1. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to examine how unemployment and active labour market 
programmes influence real wages in the Czech and Slovak Republics. The study is related to two 
branches of recent research on wage determination, unemployment and labour market policies. 
One strand of this research is the so-called wage curve literature, associated with Blanchflower 
and Oswald (see Blanchflower & Oswald (1994)). They claim, using different data sets, that there 
is strong empirical support for the existence of a negative relationship between wages and 
unemployment, a relationship they label ‘wage curve’. This claim is not uncontroversial, 
however. There are questions about the theoretical foundations as well as the empirical 
robustness of the results. Only few studies have estimated wage curves for the countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe. Using pooled micro data from five Central and Eastern European 
countries, Blanchflower and Oswald (1999) find a similar degree of wage flexibility as in 
Western OECD countries. Evidence of wage curves in the former Eastern Germany is also 
reported by Baltagi, Blien and Wolf (2000). 
Another strand of research is mainly of Nordic origin. The issue here is to study the effects of 
active labour market programmes (ALMPs) in a broad sense. ALMPs are usually defined as 
including direct job creation, labour market training and job broking for the unemployed. The 
main objective of ALMPs is to increase the employability of the participants, which should lead 
to decreasing unemployment rates. However, ALMPs will also affect non-participants: taxes have 
to be raised to finance the programmes, the competition for the existing jobs will increase, and 
the wages of participants and non-participants are likely to be affected.1  
The issue in this paper is whether active labour market programmes contribute to wage pressure, 
thereby crowding out regular employment. Empirical studies on Nordic countries report mixed 
evidence of such effects (see e.g. Calmfors and Nymoen (1990); Calmfors and Forslund (1991), 
Forslund (1994), Edin, Holmlund and Östros (1994), Raaum and Wulfsberg (1997), Rödseth and 
Nymoen (1999), and Forslund and Kolm (2000)). 
                                                  
1 A survey of macroeconomic evaluations of labour market programmes is given in Calmfors (1994)    3
In the 1990s, active labour market policy has been used in Central and Eastern Europe as an 
important measure to increase the employability of the unemployed. The use of ALMPs has 
varied considerably between countries and time periods. For example in 1997, the share of 
persons in active labour market programmes to the total number of unemployed was 11.4 percent 
in the Czech Republic, 24.4 in Slovakia, and 20.5 in Hungary2. 
Most of the existing evaluations of ALMPs in Central and Eastern Europe focus on the effects of 
participants’ future income or employment (Puhani (1998); Lubyova and van Ours (1998); 
Terrell and Sorm (1998); and Kluwe, Lehmann and Schmidt (1999)). A few studies have 
estimated augmented matching functions to study effects of ALMPs on the matching process of 
vacancies and unemployed persons (Boeri (1997); Boeri and Burda (1996) and Burda and 
Lubyova (1995)). Pannenberg and Schwarze (1998), which to my knowledge is the only study 
that try to estimate effects of ALMPs on real wages in a transition country, estimate individual 
wage equations for the former East Germany using regional data on unemployment and ALMPs.  
In this paper, I use regional panel data to examine effects of ALMPs on wage setting in the Czech 
and Slovak Republics. The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the 
developments on the labour market and the use of ALMPs in the Czech and Slovak Republics in 
the 1990s. Section 3 discusses the wage setting process in the Czech and Slovak Republics. 
Section 4 outlines the theoretical framework. The data is presented in section 5 and the results of 
the empirical analysis are reported in section 6. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Unemployment and Active Labour Market Policy in the Czech and Slovak Republics
3 
The Czech and Slovak Republics have had very different labour market experiences in the 1990s 
(see Figure 1). The Czech unemployment rate was until 1997 lower than four percent, much 
lower than in all other post-communist countries in Central Europe, and the Czech Republic’s 
                                                  
2 Total number of unemployed is defined as the number of openly unemployed plus the number of participants in active 
labour market programmes 
3 The information and statistics in this section are mainly based on MPSV (1998) for the Czech Republic, Czech and 
Slovak legal provisions (mainly amended versions of the laws of employment No 1/1991 in the Czech Republic and No.   4
labour market performance was until recently characterised as a “miracle”. However, after a 
recession in 1997-98, the halo has tarnished and Czech unemployment rate reached nine percent 
in the end of 1999
4. In Slovakia, the unemployment rate increased fast in the beginning of the 
1990s to double-digit levels. After being stable around 13-14 percent during must of the decade, 
it started to increase again in 1998. In the end of 1999, more than 18 percent of the labour force 
was unemployed in Slovakia. 
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Active labour market policy was introduced in the former Czechoslovakia in the second half of 
1991 as a key device to hamper an expected unemployment crisis. Expenditures on active labour 
market programmes increased fast in 1992 and 1993 (see table 1 and 2). The expenditures were 
divided on a per capita basis between the two republics, which led to a higher number of 
programme places per unemployed in the Czech part of the country, where the unemployment 
                                                                                                                                                                  
387/96 in Slovakia) and discussions with officials at the Czech Employment Services and the Slovak National Labour 
Office.   5
rate was lower
5. Differences in ALMP spending have been regarded as a key factor explaining 
the different labour market performance in the early 1990s of the Czech and Slovak Republics 
(see for example Boeri and Burda (1996)). 
 
Table 1. Active labour market programmes in the Czech Republic.  
  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998 
Registered unemployed
1  166,820  153,064  172,809  156,091  159,230  216,026  302,379 
Unemployment rate
  3.0  3.0  3.4  3.1  3.1  4.4  6.1 
Active labour market programmes
1  102,327  119,884  80,425  53,614  36,354  27,969  28,833 
% share in:  Training  4.3   2.2  3.6  4.7   6.0   7.8  7.9 
  Public works  11.2   5.2  7.7  10.8   15.3   20.2  23.9 
  Wage subsidies  84.5   84.7  81.0  74.0   66.4   57.9  52.1 
  Youth programmes  0.0   8.0  7.7  10.4   12.3   14.1  16.1 
Share of ALMPs in total unemployment
2   38.0   43.9  31.8  25.6   18.6   11.5  8.7 
1. Average number of persons in unemployment and labour market programmes 
2. Total unemployment is defined as openly unemployed plus ALMP participants 
Source: Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs of the Czech Republic. 
 
Table 2. Active labour market programmes in Slovakia.  
  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998 
Registered unemployed
1  281,080  318,723  366,026  351,412  325,379  337,412  382,818 
Unemployment rate  11.3  12.9  14.4  13.7  12.6  13.1  14.7 
Active labour market programmes   75,133  115,471  115,525  127,110  135,558  108,656  na 
% share 
in 
Training  6.0  2.6  2.2  2.4  2.7  3.6  na 
  Public works  25.5  6.5  4.8  14.7  19.2  20.4  na 
  Wage subsidies  68.5  90.9  93.0  82.9  78.2  76.0  na 
Share of ALMPs in total 
unemployment
2 
21.1  26.6  24.0  26.6  29.4  24.4  na 
1. Average number of persons in unemployment and labour market programmes 
2. Total unemployment is defined as openly unemployed plus ALMP participants 
Source: National Labour Office of the Slovak Republic. 
 
After the division of Czechoslovakia in 1993, the spending on ALMPs in the Slovak Republic 
increased fast and ALMP spending continued to be high during the following years. The Czech 
government chose a different path and the number of programme places decreased every year 
until 1998. In Slovakia, financial restrictions decreased spending on ALMPs in 1997. After the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
4 See OECD (1998) for a discussion of the “Czech miracle” 
5 Burda and Lubyova (1995)   6
change of government in the Czech Republic in 1998, the trend has reversed and spending on 
ALMPs was increasing in 1999. 
The scope of the active labour market policy used has been more or less the same during the 
whole 1990s in both the Czech and the Slovak Republics and includes a broad range of measures, 
where the most important are labour market training, subsidies to stimulate job creation, public 
works and support to self-employed. The most important active labour market measures in the 
Czech and Slovak Republics during the 1990s have been different programmes to support job 
creation (wage subsidy programmes)
6. To stimulate creation of permanent jobs mostly in the 
private sector, the labour offices could subsidise part of the labour costs of a newly hired 
unemployed worker. In both the Czech and Slovak Republics, the subsidised job must last a 
minimum of two years. The subsidy could be given to the employer in the form of loans, a direct 
subsidy to cover part of the participant’s wage, to cover interest payments on credits, or to cover 
a part of specified investments. In the second half of the 1990s, the direct wage subsidy has been 
the most frequently used subsidy form. Special wage subsidy programmes is targeted at self-
employment, youth, and disabled. The employer determines the wage for the participant in 
discussions with the local labour office. Collective agreements are taken under consideration and 
the paid wage should correspond to the overall wage level in the sector. 
Public works
7 are subsidies for short-time manual jobs in the public sector for long-term 
unemployed and persons with low attachment to the labour market. The subsidy rate varies, but it 
is often close to actual labour costs. The programmes are normally lasting for a period up to 6-12 
months. When the programme expires, the unemployed could be placed in a new programme 
after a waiting period. The public works programme is often used by the labour offices as a 
screening device to test how interested an unemployed is to obtain a job. The employer and the 
local labour office determine the wage for the participant. The wage is often not much higher 
than the minimum wage. 
                                                  
6 Social Purposeful Jobs (In the Czech Republic, Spolecensky ucelne pracovne mista and Mista pro ziskani odborne praxe 
absolventu skol. In Slovakia , Spolocensky ucelne pracovne miesta up to 1996 and Pracovne miesta na samozamestnanie 
(§88 in the Law of Employment (c. 387/1996 Z.z)) u zamestnavatela (§89) and pre absolventa skoly alebo mladistvych 
(§90) since 1996). 
7 Verejne prospesne prace in the Czech Republic and Verejnoprospesne pracovne miesta (since 1996 (§91)) in Slovakia   7
The number of persons in labour market training has been very low by OECD standards in the 
Czech and Slovak Republics. Most of the participants are offered training to meet a specific 
employer’s needs. The length of the training is between a few weeks to a couple months. The 
participants receive a benefit that is slightly higher than the regular unemployment benefit.  
In table 3 and 4, approximations of the average subsidy for different programme types are 
displayed. The average subsidy is calculated as the spending divided by inflow to a programme in 
a year
8. The average subsidy for a participant in the wage subsidy programme has been much 
higher in Slovakia than in the Czech Republic during 1992-1996. Average subsidies for 
participants in public works and labour market training have, however, been at the same level in 
both countries. 
In the Czech Republic, an overall budget for ALMPs is decided in the beginning of each year by 
the central authorities. It is financed through the state budget. The allocation of resources is then 
divided between districts depending on local labour market conditions as unemployment levels 
and rates, unemployment/vacancy ratios, stocks of participants in ALMPs, and past records of 
local labour offices in implementing programmes. Local labour offices have discretion over the 
allocation of the annual ALMP budget for different ALMPs. 10 – 15 percent of the budget is 
distributed during the year to cover special needs and finance special projects.  
In Slovakia, the labour market policy is financed by a special payroll tax of 4 percent of the wage 
of the employed (3 percent is paid by the employer and 1 percent by the worker). Funds are 
distributed from the National Labour Office through regional labour offices down to the district 
labour offices
9. Funds are allocated to local labour offices on a quarterly basis and follows a rule 
that is governed by the following criteria: unemployment rate, number of unemployed, share of 
unemployed in long-term unemployment, share of unemployed in retraining, and the number of 
contributions to the Employment Fund in the region. The regional labour offices have some 
discretion in distributing funds to the district labour offices. As in the Czech Republic, local 
 
                                                  
8 As the programmes often last more than one year, this approximation is not entirely correct. 
9 After the administrative reform in 1996, Slovakia consists of 8 regions (kraj) and 79 districts (okres)   8
Table 3. Cost of active labour market programmes in the Czech Republic 
  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998 
Wage subsidies               
Inflow of participants  82,277  19,630  16,727  11,895  8,996  6,446  18,201 
Expenditures (mil CZK)  1,294  463  368  281  202  168  374 
Average cost of a programme place 
(CZK) 
15,700  23,600  22,000  23,600  22,500  26,000  20,500 
               
Public works               
Inflow of participants  25,503  11,760  12,927  10,821  10,259  11,888  11,088 
Expenditures (mil CZK)  223  160  184  190  199  224  281 
Average cost of a programme place 
(CZK) 
8,700  13,600  14,200  17,600  19,400  18,800  25,300 
               
Labour market training               
Inflow of participants  17,590  12,095  14,814  13,454  12,107  11,448  16,540 
Expenditures (mil CZK)  98  73  103  100  92  90  147 
Average cost of a programme place 
(CZK) 
5,600  6,000  7,000  7,400  7,600  7,900  8,900 
               
Total               
Inflow of participants  125,370  43,485  44,468  36,170  31,362  29,782  45,829 
Expenditures (mil CZK)  1,615  696  655  571  493  482  802 
Average cost of a programme place 
(CZK) 
12,900  16,000  14,700  15,800  15,700  16,200  17,500 
Source: MPSV (1998) and Munich/Jurajda/Cihak (1999) 
Table 4. Cost of active labour market programmes in Slovakia 
  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997 
Wage subsidies             
Inflow of participants  84,314  33,591  30,529  42,851  24,460  Na 
Expenditures (mil SKK)  3,088  808  1,593  3,217  2,659  2,014 
Average cost of a programme place 
(SKK) 
36,600  24,000  52,200  75,000  108,700  Na 
             
Public works             
Inflow of participants  40,977  13,137  14,962  43,520  35,856  Na 
Expenditures (mil SKK)  419  166  171  819  1,330  744 
Average cost of a programme place 
(SKK) 
10,200  12,600  11,400  18,800  27,000  Na 
             
Labour market training             
Inflow of participants  25,582  13,908  14,100  19,175  20,533  24,848 
Expenditures (mil SKK)  305  122  114  156  215  217 
Average cost of a programme place 
(SKK) 
11,900  8,800  8,100  8,100  10,500  8,700 
             
Total             
Inflow of participants  150,873  60,636  64,666  105,546  80,849  Na 
Expenditures (mil SKK)  3,812  1,096  1,878  4,192  4,204  Na 
Average cost of a programme place 
(SKK) 
25,300  18,100  29,000  39,700  52,000  Na 
Source: National Labour Office in Slovakia and Lubyova/Ochrankova (1999)   9
labour offices have discretion over the allocation of the ALMP budget for different ALMPs. 
About 10 percent of the budget are distributed during the year to cover special needs and to 
finance special projects. 
In Figure 2 and 3, the correlation between inflow of participants in an ALMP in 1998 and the 
unemployment rate in the end of 1997 is displayed by districts in the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia. As the strong correlation indicates, the distribution of funds for ALMPs depends on the 
local labour market situation. 
 
Figure 2: Unemployment rate and inflow of participants into ALMPs by districts 
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1. The unemployment rate in the end of 1997 and the inflow of ALMP participants in 1998 
                                                  
10 After the administrative reform in 1996, Slovakia consists of 8 regions (kraj) and 79 districts (okres)   10 
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1. The unemployment rate in the end of 1997 and the inflow of ALMP participants in 1998 
 
Too summarise, during 1992-1998, the average number of programme participants per 
unemployed are at the same level in the Czech and Slovak Republics. But whereas the level has 
been more or less stable in the Slovak Republic, the trend has been negative in the Czech 
Republic. The programme “portfolio” is rather similar in the two countries. The main difference 
between the active labour market policy in the Czech and Slovak Republics is that average 
expenditures for a participant in the wage subsidy programme are higher in Slovakia.    11 
3. Wage formation in the Czech and Slovak Republics
11 
At the first years of transition, real wages in the Czech and Slovak Republics sharply declined 
because of the high inflation that was a result of the price liberalisation (see table 5). Since 1993 
in the Czech Republic and since 1994 in Slovakia real wages started to catch up. While real 
wages in Slovakia increased in line with GDP growth per worker for most of the 1990s, Czech 
real wages had a much stronger development than productivity until 1997. The strong real wage 
development in the Czech Republic has been cited as one of the main reasons for the exchange 
rate crises in 1997 that was the start of the recession
12. 
 
Table 5: Wage developments in the Czech and Slovak Republics 
  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998 
Czech Republic                 
Nominal wages
1  3,789  4,585  5.817  6,869  8,166  9,679  10,696  11,709 
Nominal wage growth (%)
2  16.7  21.0  26.9  18.1  18.9  18.5  10.5  9.5 
Inflation (%)
3  56.6  11.1  20.8  10.0  9.1  8.8  8.5  10.7 
Real wage growth (%)  -39.9  9.9  6.1  8.1  9.8  9.7  2.0  -1.2 
GDP growth  -11.3  -3.3  0.6  3.2  6.4  3.8  0.3  -2.3 
                 
Slovak Republic                 
Nominal wages
1  3,748  4,519  5,379  6,294  7,195  8,154  9,226  10,347 
Nominal wage growth (%)
2  16.5  20.6  19.0  17.0  14.3  13.3  13.1  12.2 
Inflation (%)
3  61.2  10.1  23.2  13.4  9.9  5.8  6.1  6.7 
Real wage growth (%)
  -44.7  10.5  -4.2  3.6  4.4  7.5  7.0  5.5 
GDP growth (%)  -14.6  -6.5  -3.7  4.9  6.9  6.6  6.5  4.4 
Source: Czech Statistical Office and Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic 
1. Czech respective Slovak crowns, annual average 
2. Year to year changes in annual averages 
3. Changes in CPI, annual average 
 
In the Czech and Slovak Republics, a decentralisation of wage bargaining has taken place during 
the 1990s. In 1989, all employees in the Czech and Slovak Republics were covered by a system 
where the government regulated wages. In 1998, only about a third of the private-sector workers 
in the Czech Republic were covered by collective agreements. The corresponding figure for 
                                                  
11 This section is based on discussions with officials at the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs and the Czecho-
Moravian Confederation of Trade Unions in the Czech Republic, the Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family and 
the Confederation of Trade Unions in the Slovak Republic.    12 
Slovakia was about 50 percent. As not all collective agreements involve wages, the actual 
number of workers that negotiate wages through collective bargaining is even lower. Wage 
bargaining takes place at the industry and the firm level. Occasionally, there has also been 
bargaining through a top-level tripartite body, composed by representatives from trade unions, 
employer associations and the government. In 1998, 25 (56) industry-level collective agreements 
and several thousands firm-level collective agreements were signed in the Czech (Slovak) 
Republic. The trade union or the employer association can apply to the Ministry of Labour to get 
the industry-level agreement extended to firms initially not covered by the agreement. This 
option has only played a minor role during the 1990s in the Czech Republic, but it is used 
extensively in the Slovak Republic. 
Wages to employees paid by the state budget is regulated through a complex tariff system, where 
the wages among other things depend on experience, education and the character of the work. 
About a third of the workforce in the Czech and Slovak Republics were covered by this system in 
1998. The tariffs, and the wages, are changed irregularly by the government. For example in the 
Czech Republic, the wages were not increased at all in 1997 and 1998 due to the tight fiscal 
discipline maintained by the government. In the beginning of 1999, wages were then increased by 
17 percent.  
The remaining share of the workforce, not covered by collective agreements, is negotiating their 
wages individually at their firms. The wage-setting process is however influenced through a set 
of laws that regulate minimum wages, remuneration for overtime and other working conditions. 
A legally binding minimum wage was introduced in the former Czechoslovakia in 1991. When 
the minimum wage was introduced, it was assumed that it should not be lower than the minimum 
living standard and not lower than 50 percent of the average wage. During the 1990s, the 
minimum wage has not been raised at the same pace as average wages. Thus, the effect of the 
minimum wage on the wage formation has gradually eroded. In 1998, the monthly minimum 
wage was 2,650 CZK and 3,000 SLK in the Czech and Slovak Republics respectively. That is 
22.6 percent and 29.5 percent of the average wage for all workers. As a complement to the 
minimum wage, a three-level (twelve-level) minimum wage tariffs exist in the Czech (Slovak) 
                                                                                                                                                                  
12 OECD (1998) p. 15   13 
Republic. It specifies a minimum wage depending on the status, responsibility and difficulty of 
the job. These minimum wage tariffs are legally binding for firms not covered by collective 
agreements. 
As an aim to prevent excessive wage growth from the liberalisation of prices, wage regulations in 
the form of a tax-based income policy was in place 1991-1995 in the Czech Republic and 
sporadically 1991 – 1994 and 1998 in the Slovak Republic. Prohibitive taxes were imposed on 
firms that raised wages substantially more than the inflation. The tax also sometimes depended 
on firm performance. Some of the regulations were not applied to all industries and frequent 
exemptions were given. 
 
4. Theoretical framework 
Following Calmfors and Forslund (1991), I will discuss how unemployment and labour market 
programmes influence wage formation. The wage is assumed to be determined by a monopoly 
union
13. The employer then unilaterally sets employment. In the Czech and Slovak Republics, 
unions play a major role in bargaining over wages in some sectors (in particular in sectors where 
state ownership still is important). The wages determined in these sectors are often used as 
baselines for bargaining in other sectors where unions are weaker. 
A union attached to a specific firm maximises an objective function that is given by 
( ) ( ) V w V N U i
n
i i i - =                 (1) 
where  i N is employment in firm i, 
n
i V  the utility of a worker employed by firm i, and V  the 
utility for a laid-off worker. The individual union maximises (1) subject to a labour demand 
function for workers  ( ) i i i w N N = , where  0 / < ¶ ¶ i i w N . 
Assuming an interior solution, the first-order condition for the optimal wage is given by: 
                                                  
13 The same qualitative results will go through in the case of Nash bargaining between unions and firms or in efficiency 
wage models.   14 
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In a symmetrical equilibrium  w wi =  for all i. Thus, (2) will represent an aggregate wage 
equation.  
Labour market conditions will influence the wage equation through the utility of a laid-off 
worker, V . We have 
V V d dw F =sgn / sgn , assuming that the second order condition is fulfilled. 
Clearly  0 > FV . 
In examining the effect of labour market conditions on V , we assume that a laid-off worker will 
enter one of three different states. First, the worker can be re-employed receiving  ( ) w V , or 
become openly unemployed receiving  ( ) b V , or be enrolled in a labour market programme 
receiving  ( ) a V . The alternative utility of a laid-off worker can be written as a weighted average 
of the utility in these three states, i.e., 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) b V a V w V V b a b a - - + + = 1             (3) 
where a  is the probability of being re-employed and b  the probability of being enrolled in a 
labour market programme. 
The re-employment probability for a worker is assumed to be increasing in the employment rate 
and decreasing in average job search effectiveness (given constant job search effectiveness of the 
worker).  





























= j a a a , 1 ,      (4) 
where  u s and  r s are the level of job search effectiveness of the openly unemployed and 
programme participants. U is the unemployment rate and R is the participation rate, both relative 
to the labour force, L. U/(U+R) is, thus, the share of openly unemployed in total unemployment. 
( ) R U R + = j /  is the share of programme participants in total unemployment, thus the   15 
accommodative stance of the government or the local labour office. The probability of being 
enrolled in a programme, b, depends positively on the accommodative stance j ,  ( ) j b b= . 
If total unemployment, defined as the sum of the open unemployment rate and the rate of 
programme participants to the labour force, U+R, increases given that the accommodative stance 








V                   (5) 
Thus, the wage will unambiguously decrease if unemployment increases. Consider now an 
increase in the accommodative stance, j , given that total unemployment, U+R, is constant. The 
total effect on the alternative utility of a laid-off worker is 








2         (6) 
Two effects are present. First, an increase in the accommodative stance will increase the utility of 
a laid-off worker, and the average wage, if the utility of being enrolled in a programme is higher 
than the utility of being open unemployed. Second, an increase in the accommodative stance 
reduces the utility of a laid-off worker, and the average wage, if the search effectiveness is higher 
for a programme participant than for an open unemployed and the utility of being employed is 
higher than the utility of being openly unemployed. The competition for available jobs increases, 
which will decrease the re-employment probability for an individual job seeker and put 
downward pressure on the average wage. Calmfors and Lang (1995) show that this effect will be 
stronger if programmes are targeted at long-term unemployed or labour force entrants.  
If labour market programmes reduce the flow out of the labour force, job competition will 
increase and the re-employment probability will decrease, which will put downward pressure on 
wages. On the other hand, the decreased risk of dropping out of the labour force will put upward 
pressure on wages given that the utility of not participating in the labour force is lower than in 
other states (see Calmfors and Lang (1995)). The total effect of labour market programmes on the 
wage is thus ambiguous.   16 
Which effects can we expect from different kinds of active labour market programmes? In 
general, programmes that will aim to increase the employability, in raising search effectiveness, 
of the unemployed will contribute to job competition and have a smaller effect on wages. 
Programmes that increase the relative utility of participants will have the opposite effect. 
Labour market training focus directly on increasing the employability of the unemployed and the 
benefit for participants are often not higher than the unemployment benefits. The wage effect of 
an increase in labour market training is thus expected to be smaller. Wage subsidy programmes, 
where the wage for programme participants often significantly exceeds the unemployment benefit 
level, increase the utility for participants. The effect of wage subsidy programmes on wages is 
thus expected to be stronger. If the wage subsidy programme targets long-term unemployed, or 
unemployed with a low probability of obtaining a job, the effect will be smaller. Public works are 
an example of this kind of a programme. 
 
5. The Data 
The data come from two sources. The Czech Statistical Office and the Statistical Office of the 
Slovak Republic provide annual data by district on employment and wages derived from surveys 
of most of the employers, both public and private, in the Czech and Slovak Republics
14. The data 
on unemployment and number of persons in different labour market programmes are provided by 
the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs in the Czech Republic and the National Labour Office 
in Slovakia. 
Slovakia carried out a major administrative reform in 1996. The old territorial structure with 38 
districts was turned into a new structure with 79 districts. The geographical composition of the 
new districts differs considerably from the old division of the country and aggregation into the 
old districts is not always possible. Only 22 out of the 38 old districts are possible to recreate. 
Through adding of old districts and re-creation of districts that are almost possible to recreate 
(where the difference is only a few municipalities with a population lower than 5,000 
                                                  
14 The samples change slightly over time. Since 1997, the sample include all employers with more than 20 employees.   17 
inhabitants), I have been able to construct 29 districts that cover almost the entire area of the 
Slovak Republic
15. 
To calculate average annual wages by districts, I use annual data that is based on the location of 
the workplace. The average wage is calculated by dividing the annual wage sum with the annual 
average number of employees for each workplace within the district. One concern is that the data 
do not separate between employees with different working hours. The number of employees with 
shorter working hours is however very low in the Czech and Slovak Republics.  
Information on the number of unemployed and the number of programme participants is 
measured on a monthly basis. In the estimations, I use the stock at the end of December the 
preceding year. This will, at least partially, control for the simultaneity problem that arises 
because the number of unemployed and programme participants depend on the labour market 
situation and, hence, on wages. 
Programme participants are divided into three categories: labour market training, wage subsidies, 
and public works. Basically, this categorisation is based on the theoretical presumptions that 
different kind of programmes could have different effects on the wage formation. These 
categories do also to a large extent coincide with the policies pursued by the Czech and the 
Slovak governments. 
To control for district-specific shocks, I have constructed a local demand index using a one-digit 
breakdown by industry of employment in districts. The index is constructed as the change in 
employment that would occur between two years given that the district had the same employment 
development by industry as the whole country.
16 
                                                  
15 The area surrounding Bratislava was not possible to recreate in any good way. The old districts Galanta, Bratislava-
vidiek and Senica are therefore not included in the analysis. 









1 , where N denotes employment, i district, t time, and 
j industry,    18 
This leaves us with a panel of 73 districts for the Czech Republic and 31 districts in the Slovak 
Republic for the period 1992-1998
17. The basic characteristics of the variables are displayed in 
Table 6. 
 
Table 6. Basic characteristics of the variables for Czech and Slovak districts 
  Czech Republic  Slovak Republic 
Variable  Definition  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev. 
RWAGE  Real wage
1 
5,132  780  4,425  526 
UN  The total number of 
unemployed
2 by December 
31
th / labour force
2 
0.076  0.036  0.236  0.079 
LMP  The number of programme 
participants / total number of 
unemployed (by December 
31
th) 
0.217  0.165  0.234  0.114 
LMT  The number of participants in 
training / total number of 
unemployed (by December 
31
th) 
0.012  0.011  0.011  0.0089 
WS  The number of participants in 
wage subsidy programmes / 
total number of unemployed 
(by December 31
th) 
0.187  0.159  0.191  0.108 
PW  The number of participants in 
public works / total number of 
unemployed (by December 
31
th) 
0.018  0.018  0.032  0.038 
LDI  Labour demand index (see 
text)  67,706  92,940  48,885  37,238 
1. 1992 prices, adjusted by CPI, Czech respective Slovak crowns 
2. The total number of unemployed equals the openly unemployed plus participants in active labour market programmes. 
 
To better display the time series and cross-sectional correlation in the data, I present so called 
Box-Whisker plots in the appendix for the key variables by year in both countries (real wage, 
unemployment rate, and the share of ALMP participants in unemployment, Figure A4-A9)
20. 
                                                  
17 Because the districts surrounding the main Czech cities, Prague and Brno, more or less are integrated into the Prague 
and Brno labour market, the districts Praha, Praha-vychod and Praha-zapad, and Brno and Brno-venkov, has been 
merged to one large district for Prague and Brno repectively. 
18 The line in the middle of the box represents the median or 50th percentile of the data. The box extends from the 25th 
percentile (x25) to the 75th percentile (x75). The lines emerging from the box are called whiskers and they extend to the 
upper and lower adjacent values. The upper adjacent value defined as the largest data point less than or equal to x75+ 
1.5*(x75 - x25) and the lower adjacent value is defined as the smallest data point greater than or equal to x25 - 1.5*(x75 - 
x25).Observed points more extreme than the adjacent values, if any, are referred to as outside values and are individually 
plotted (StataCorp (1999)). 
19 Mlada Boleslav is the hometown of the Volkswagen-owned Skoda Auto 
20 The line in the middle of the box represents the median or 50th percentile of the data. The box extends from the 25th 
percentile (x25) to the 75th percentile (x75). The lines emerging from the box are called whiskers and they extend to the 
upper and lower adjacent values. The upper adjacent value defined as the largest data point less than or equal to x75+   19 
Note that the wage dispersion by districts has not increased in the Czech Republic, excluding 
Prague and Mlada Boleslav
21, during the 1990s. In Slovakia, wage dispersion as measured by the 
box (the 75
th percentile - 25
th percentile) has more than doubled. 
In Appendix (Figure A10-A13), I also display graphs of the correlation between real wages and 
the total unemployment rate (the share of ALMP participants in total unemployment) by year in 
both countries. The correlation between real wages and total unemployment is strongly negative 
in Slovakia, but almost no correlation is found in the Czech Republic. The share of ALMP 
participants in the total unemployment rate is negatively correlated with the real wage in the 
Czech Republic, but no correlation is found in Slovakia. 
 
6. Results 
Following the theoretical discussion in section 4, I choose an empirical specification given by 
it i it it it t it f LDI LMP UN RWAGE e m g l s + + + + + = ln ln       (8) 
where i denotes district, t year,  t s  is a time dummy,  it RWAGE  the average real wage,  it UN  the 
total unemployed rate (U+R),  it LMP  the number of programme participants to the total number 
of unemployed, thus the accommodative stance (j = R/(U+R)), and  it LDI  the labour demand 
index. fi is a district fixed effect that do not vary over time, and  it e  is an error term. l, g  and m 
are parameters to be estimated (see table 6 for definitions of the variables). 
First, I assume that the fixed effects, fi, are equal for all districts. To do this, I apply ordinary least 
squares, OLS, on pooled data for the Czech and Slovak Republics, respectively
22. The results are 
presented in Table 7 and Table 8 (Column 1 and 2).  
                                                                                                                                                                  
1.5*(x75 - x25) and the lower adjacent value is defined as the smallest data point greater than or equal to x25 - 1.5*(x75 - 
x25).Observed points more extreme than the adjacent values, if any, are referred to as outside values and are individually 
plotted (StataCorp (1999)). 
21 Mlada Boleslav is the hometown of the Volkswagen-owned Skoda Auto 
22 Time dummies and a constant are included   20 
Table 7. Results for different specifications for the Czech Republic
1 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 












lnUNneigh  -  -  -  -  -0.086*** 
(0.012) 
- 
LMP   -0.119*** 
(0.036) 
-  0.013 
(0.022) 




LMPneigh  -  -  -  -  0.150*** 
(0.035) 
- 
lnUN + lnUNneigh  -  -  -  -  -  -0.086*** 
(0.012) 
LMP + LMPneigh  -  -  -  -  -  0.150*** 
(0.035) 
LMT  -  0.239 
(0.295) 
-  -0.082 
(0.170) 
-  - 
WS  -  -0.159*** 
(0.037) 
-  0.017 
(0.023) 
-  - 
PW  -  0.096 
(0.189) 
-  -0.033 
(0.108) 
-  - 












District fixed effects  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
No of districts  73  73  73  73  73  73 
No of observations  511  511  511  511  511  511 
R-square  0.773  0.768  0.948  0.948  0.954  0.954 
1. The log of the real wage (lnRWAGE) is the dependent variable. Standard errors in parentheses, * indicates significance at the 10 percent level, 
** significance at the 5 percent level, and *** significance at the 1 percent level. Year dummies are included.  
 
Table 8. Results for different specifications for the Slovak Republic1 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 












lnUNneigh  -  -  -  -  -0.020 
(0.029) 
- 
LMP   0.148*** 
(0.041) 
-  0.092*** 
(0.029) 




LMPneigh  -  -  -  -  0.062 
(0.054) 
- 
lnUN + lnUNneigh  -  -  -  -  -  -0.020 
(0.029) 
LMP + LMPneigh  -  -  -  -  -  0.062 
(0.054) 
LMT  -  -0.220 
(0.511) 
-  -0.546 
(0.373) 
-  - 
WS  -  0.137*** 
(0.043) 
-  0.084*** 
(0.031) 
-  - 
PW  -  0.230** 
(0.107) 
-  0.126** 
(0.059) 
-  - 












District fixed effects  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
No of districts  29  29  29  29  29  29 
No of observations  203  203  203  203  203  203 
R-square  0.808  0.810  0.897  0.899  0.897  0.897 
1. The log of the real wage (lnRWAGE) is the dependent variable. Standard errors in parentheses, * indicates significance at the 10 percent level, 
** significance at the 5 percent level, and *** significance at the 1 percent level. Year dummies are included. 
   21 
The results show a significant negative effect of unemployment and a significant positive effect 
of the accommodative stance of labour market programmes on wages in Slovakia. In the Czech 
Republic, the effects of labour market programmes are significant and with a negative sign, while 
the effect of unemployment on wages is much smaller than in Slovakia. 
To investigate to what extent these differences between the Czech Republic and Slovakia are a 
result of imposing equal fixed unobservable effects between districts, fi’s, I apply a standard fixed 
effect model, i.e. OLS on deviations from individual means. The results are presented in Table 7 
and Table 8 (Column 3 and 4). The fixed effect regressions confirm that the results for Slovakia 
are stronger than for the Czech Republic. 
The unemployment elasticity of pay is more than two times higher in Slovakia. This means that if 
the district unemployment rate doubles, real wages will decrease with 7 percent in Slovakia and 3 
percent in the Czech Republic. The unemployment elasticity of pay for Slovakia is equal to, but 
the elasticity for the Czech Republic is lower than the 0.1 estimated by Blanchflower & Oswald 
(1994) for several western countries. The results for the Czech Republic are more in line with the 
results reported by Blanchflower & Oswald (1999) for five Central and Eastern European 
countries (including the Czech Republic, but not Slovakia). They use individual wage data and 
regional labour market data for the time period 1990-1995 and estimate an unemployment 
elasticity of pay of -0.042
23. 
The elasticity of the accommodative stance of labour market programmes to wages is not 
significant in the Czech Republic. In Slovakia, I found a positive significant coefficient for the 
accommodative stance of labour market programmes (table 8, column 3) and a positive 
significant coefficient of the wage subsidy programme (WS) and public works (PW) (table 8, 
column 3). Less precisely, I also estimate a negative coefficient for labour market training (LMT). 
The wage subsidy programme seems to exert upward pressure on wages in Slovakia. If the 
number of participants in the wage subsidy programme in relation to the total number 
unemployed in a district increases with 10 percentages, holding total unemployment constant, 
average real wages will increase with 0.9 percent. Following the theoretical discussion in section 
                                                  
23 They also report estimations for the shorter time periods, 1991-1995 and 1992-1995, where the unemployment 
elasticity of wages is estimated to –0.063 and -0.090, respectively.   22 
4, participation in the wage subsidy programme and public works increases the utility (or 
decreases the disutility) of becoming unemployed, and the negative effect of increased wages (in 
form of increased joblessness) becomes less awkward for the trade union or individual workers. 
For labour market training, which has a stronger focus on skill formation and where the average 
subsidies are lower, we do not find this effect on wages. 
The estimated effects of the influence of unemployment and ALMPs on wages in a district are 
unbiased only if a district coincides with a labour market area. This need not always be the case. I 
will test for alternative measures of labour market areas by introducing variables of the labour 
market situation in neighbouring districts. Thus, the variable UNneigh corresponds to the total 
unemployment rate in all adjacent districts
24. The variable LMPneigh is constructed in a similar 
way.  
The results are presented in Table 7 and 8 (column 5). Effects of unemployment and ALMPs 
from neighbouring districts are very strong in the Czech Republic. Thus, the districts in the 
Czech Republic do not seem to correspond to labour market areas. Strong effects of 
unemployment and ALMPs are shared between adjacent districts. When including neighbouring 
districts in the equation for the Czech Republic, I estimate a significant positive effect on wages 
from ALMPs and a stronger negative effect from unemployment. 
In Slovakia, the effects from the unemployment rate on wages within districts outweigh the 
effects from neighbouring districts. The effect of the accommodative stance in a district is, 
however, does not differ much from the effects of the accommodative stance in neighbouring 
districts. 
The size of the districts used in the estimations in the Czech Republic and Slovakia are on 
average equal (with a working-age population of around 90,000). The results indicate that labour 
market areas are smaller in Slovakia than in the Czech Republic. This could be caused by less 
commuting and less diversified regional labour markets in Slovakia. 
                                                  




kt it neigh LF UN UN / , where k is the adjacent districts.   23 
To test if the effects within districts are equal to effects in neighbouring districts, I estimate the 
specification  
( ) ( ) ￿ ￿ + + + + + + + ￿ ￿ =
it neigh it it it neigh it it it LMP LMP LMP UN UN UN RWAGE 2 1 2 1 ln ln ln ln g g l l (9) 
If l1 = 0 and g1 = 0, the coefficient of the unemployment rate and ALMPs in one district is equal 
to the coefficient of the unemployment rate in neighbouring districts. The results from these 
estimations are presented in Table 7 and 8 (column 6). The restriction does not hold for the Czech 
Republic ( 0 1 „ l  and  0 1 „ g ). In Slovakia the restriction hold for ALMPs, but not for the total 
unemployment rate ( 0 1 „ l  and  0 1 = g ). The effect of ALMPs is however not significant in 
Slovakia when allowing for effects from neighbouring districts.  
 
7. Conclusions 
In this paper, I have presented results regarding the effects of unemployment and labour market 
programmes on real wages in the Czech and Slovak Republics using district paneldata for the 
period 1992-1998. Clear evidence of a “wage curve” exists in both countries. The estimated 
unemployment elasticity of pay is, however, higher in the Slovak Republic, than in the Czech 
Republic. The wage subsidy and the public works programme exert upward pressure on real 
wages in Slovakia. When accounting for effects from adjacent districts, a positive significant 
effect of labour market programmes is also estimated for the Czech Republic. 
According to the estimations in this paper, the use of active labour programmes had significant 
positive effects of wages in both the Czech and Slovak Republics. Following the theoretical 
framework presented in section 4, increased focus on active labour market programmes have two 
competing effects on wages. Increased utility among the unemployed will decrease the pain of 
becoming unemployed, and consequently, it will have a positive impact on wages. On the other 
hand, increased competition among jobs-seekers will exert negative pressure on wages. In the 
Czech and Slovak Republics, the first effect dominates. According to Calmfors and Lang (1995), 
the second effect will be stronger if programmes are targeted at long-term unemployed or labour 
force entrants. Some evidence (see for example Ham et al. (1994)) indicates that participation in 
active labour market programmes, at least early in the 1990s, to a large extent was offered to the   24 
best applicants, rather than those with poor re-employment prospects. The evidence presented in 
this paper is consistent with these observations. 
In this study, I found some differences between the Czech and Slovak Republics. These countries 
have had major differences in labour market performance during the 1990s. They have also to 
some extent chosen different policy options. It would be interesting to extend or complement this 
study with results from other countries in the region, for example Poland, Hungary and the Baltic 
countries. These countries have chosen other policy options and the labour market outcome 
varies considerably in the region. Another interesting extension would be to analyse crowding–
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Figure A2: Administrative division of Slovakia before 1996 
 
 
Figure A3: Administrative division of Slovakia after 1996 
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Figure A6: Box - Whisker plot of the total unemployment rate




























































1. Openly unemployed plus ALMP participants as a share of the labour force 
Figure A7: Box - Whisker plot of the total unemployment rate
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1. Openly unemployed plus ALMP participants as a share of the labour force   30 
Figure A8: Box - Whisker plot of the share of ALMP participants in total unemployment by 















































































Figure A9: Box - Whisker plot of the share of ALMP participants in total unemployment by 



































































   31 
Figure A10: The correlation between real wages and the total unemployment rate by year 
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Figure A11: The correlation between real wages and the total unemployment rate by year 
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Figure A12: The correlation between real wages and the share of ALMP participants in 
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Figure A13: The correlation between real wages and the share of ALMP participants in 
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